5r« 

FEB  1 


<f/i 


KIDD'S 


"SOCIAL  EVOLUTION." 


By  GEO.  S.  PATTON,  A.  M. 


V.    KIDD'S  SOCIAL  EYOLUTION.^ 

In  his  recent  book  on  Barwinianism  Mr.  Stirling  quotes  from 
a  letter  of  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  to  the  elder  Darwin,  as  follows: 

'^Sir:  In  acknowledging  the  delight  which  I  received  from  the 
perusal  of  Zoonoiiiia^  I  only  agree  with  the  public  voice.  I  am, 
however,  surprised,  that  while  every  one  has  been  delighted,  no 
one  as  yet  has  answered.  The  transition  is  natural  from  passive 
admiration  to  a  strict  examination.  Such,  at  least,  was  my  men- 
tal history  on  reading.  The  reasoning  appeared  to  me  in  some 
passages  more  specious  than  solid.  I,  therefore,  for  my  own 
amusement,  marked  down  my  observations." 

Thus  "expatiating  Brown,"  then  at  tlie  mature  age  of  eighteen, 
modestly  expressed  himself  in  regard  to  the  then  celebrated 
work  of  the  great  Erasmus  Darwin.  The  quotation  not  unfairly  ex- 
presses our  own  impression  of  Mr.  Kidd's  Social  Evolution^  and  may 
serve  as  a  fittting  introduction  to  our  comments  upon  it. 

Mr.  Kidd's  book  proved  an  immediate  success.  It  received 
speedy  and  flattering  recognition  from  the  public.  It  has  been 
widely  read  and  much  talked  of;  the  daily  and  weekly  press  has 
praised  it  highly.  It  has  been  called  a  remarkable  book ;  certainly 
it  is  an  able  and  stimulating  book,  and  its  success  has  been  de- 
served. There  is  ample  reason  for  the  popularity  of  Social  Evo- 
lution, It  treats  a  live  subject,  and  meets  a  demand  of  the  time. 
It  treats  a  difficult,  not  to  say  an  abstruse,  subject,  yet  it  is  not  a 
hard  book  to  read.     Though   needlessly  repetitious,  and   by  no 

'A  paper  read  before  the  Sociological  Society  of  Princeton  Seminary  Although 
this  paper  was  written  before  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Kidd's  article  in  the  February 
number  of  The  Nineteenth  Century,  I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary,  after  reading 
what  is  practically  a  brief  restatement  of  his  argument,  to  make  any  changes  in 
what  I  had  written;  nor  do  I  find  it  necessary  to  add  anything;  which  is,  perhaps, 
fortunate,  since,  though  the  subject  is  boundless,  the  space  at  my  disposal  is  lim- 
ited. On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Kidd's  article  has  rather  confirmed  me  in  the  positions 
that  I  had  taken.  I  venture,  moreover,  to  think  that  I  have  avoided  the  error 
into  which  Mr.  Kidd,  not  unjustly,  complains  that  his  critics  have  for  the  most 
part  fallen,  the  tendency,  namely,  "to  draw  off  attention  into  subsidiary  chan- 
nels and  upon  merely  side-issues,"  to  the  neglect  of  the  fundamental  theses  and 
central  argument  of  the  book. 


kidd's  social  evolution.  449 

means  free  from  inelegancies  and  inaccuracies  of  diction,  it  is 
written  in  a  plain,  straightforward  style  whicli  carries  the  reader 
easily  along.  Mr.  Kidd  is  certainly  not  a  stylist — far  from  it — 
but  he  moves  on.  His  treatment  of  his  subject  is  popular  in  char- 
acter, yet  with  all  the  appearance  of  being  scientific  in  method. 
He  has  a  great  theme,  and  he  treats  it  in  broad  outline.  He  is 
mowing  over  a  big  field,  and  he  cuts  a  wide  swath.  He  belongs 
to  the  impressionist  school,  and  is  working  on  a  large  canvas  in 
bold,  strong  strokes.  Details  are  so  unimportant  that  he  can  af- 
ford to  be  inaccurate  in  regard  to  them,  provided  the  ensemUe  is 
vivid,  provided  he  makes  you  see  and  feel  as  he  felt  and  saw;  and 
in  this  he  succeeds  admirably.  The  picture  is  clear  and  strong 
enough ;  the  only  question  is,  Is  it  true  ?  Can  water  be  such  a 
blue,  grass  such  a  green,  shadows  such  ? 

I  suppose  that  a  book  which  did  not  provoke  thought,  and  that 
did  not  raise  many  more  questions  than  it  answered,  would  not 
amount  to  much.  Mr.  Kidd's  hook,  as  already  remarked,  cer- 
tainly stimulates  thought  and  is  fertile  in  suggestion;  hence  it  is 
well  worth  reading.  To  us,  moreover,  it  is  interesting  as  another 
illustration  of  the  fact  that  religion  (whatever  may  be  true  or  false 
of  it  in  its  various  different  forms  of  manifestation)  is,  at  all  events, 
a  phenomenon  that  has  come,  and  has  come  to  stay,  and  that  it  is 
a  tremendous  social  force,  with  which  every  one,  willingly  or  not, 
has  to  reckon.  We  admire  especially  the  fine  spirit  in  which  Mr. 
Kidd  writes.  If  we  cannot  join  in  the  unstinted  praise  of  his 
book,  it  is  because  we  do  not  find  ourselves  in  agreement  with 
two  or  three,  at  least,  of  what  we  take  to  be  his  fundamental 
theses.  Social  Evolution  is  open  to,  and  is  likely  to  meet  with, 
some  pretty  severe  attacks.  No  doubt  the  very  fact  of  its  general 
popularity  would  imply  that  the  specialist  will  not  treat  it  kindly, 
even  as  Mr.  Stirling's  brilliant  book  above  mentioned,  after  being 
warmly  praised  by  the  many  who  rejoice  in  his  style  of  "  elevated 
recklessness,"  was  fanned  by  the  whirlwind  of  the  biologists'  criti- 
cism; for  scientists  write  "no  admittance,"  in  letters  large  enougli, 
over  the  entrances  to  their  particular  specialties,  however  ready 
they  may  be  to  make  excursions  into  other  provinces — nay,  to 
construe  the  universe  by  running  it  into  the  groove  of  their  ow^ 


450  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

departments.  For  our  own  part,  I  trust  that  we  are  not  so  jeal- 
ous. We  like,  for  example,  to  hear  what  Professor  Huxley  ha& 
to  say  about  ethics,  especially  when  he  comes,  as  it  were,  modestly 
under  the  mantle  of  an  ancient  moralist,  as  in  his  recent  Romanes 
Lecture,  to  which  he  prefixes  the  very  proper  sentiment  from 
Seneca:  ^'Soleo  enim  et  in  aliena  castra  transire^  non  tanqiiam 
transfuga^  sed  tanquavi  exploratory  But  we  have  changed  all 
that  since  Seneca,  and  in  these  days,  when  one  scarcely  dares  call 
his  soul  his  own,  for  fear  of  the  specialists,  I  see  nothing  for  the 
theologian  and  tlie  biblical  critic  to  do  except  to  do  as  the  rest — 
to  stand  up  for  the  dignity  of  his  department ;  to  insist  that  he, 
too,  is  a  specialist ;  and  to  smile  pityingly  upon  the  outsider  who 
ventures  to  intrude  with  his  opinion.  Why  should  Mr.  Huxley 
discourse  to  us  of  Semitic  tradition,  or  the  Gadarene  swine  ?  Or 
why  should  any  one  give  the  least  heed  to  him,  if  he  does  ? 

Mr.  Kidd's  aim  is  to  apply  the  Darwinian  method  to  man  in 
society.  Tlie  book  opens  with  an  admirable  restwie  of  the  pre- 
sent social  situation:  "Despite  the  great  advances  which  science 
has  made  during  the  past  century  in  alniost  every  other  direction, 
there  is,  it  must  be  confessed,  no  science  of  human  society,  pro- 
perly so  called."  Science,  which  has  accomplished  such  splendid 
achievements  during  the  last  century,  when  she  ascends  in  the  scale 
of  life  and  comes  to  man,  stands  helpless  in  his  presence.  The 
reason  of  this  is,  that  science  has  not  been  true  to  her  calling. 
At  tlie  very  place  where  she  ought  to  apply  her  method  most 
thoroughly,  she  has  stopped  short.  The  historian  especially, 
though  he  is  "dealing  with  the  record  of  life  in  its  highest  forms," 
....  strange  to  say,  feels  "it  scarcely  necessary  to  take  any  in- 
terest in  those  sciences  [namely,  the  biological]  which,  in  the 
truest  sense,  lead  up  to  his  subject."  The  only  hope  for  history 
and  for  social  science  is,  "for  the  biologist  to  advance  over  the 
frontier  and  carry  the  methods  of  his  science  boldly  into  human 
society,  where  he  has  but  to  deal  with  the  phenomena  of  life, 
where  he  encounters  life  at  last  under  its  highest  and  most  com- 
plex aspect."  This,  then,  is  what  Mr.  Kidd  attempts.  We  cannot 
help  thinking:  What  a  pity  it  is  that  Gibbon  was  not  a  biologist; 
and  what  a  splendid  account  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  Thucydides 


kidd's  social  evolution.  451 

might  have  given  us,  had  he  only  been  acquainted  with  the  Dar- 
winian hypothesis ! 

"\Ye  may,  perhaps,  at  the  outset  raise  a  query  as  to  the  legiti- 
macy of  Mr.  Kidd's  so-called  new  method.  Will  the  biological 
method  suffice  to  explain  the  social  organism  ?  Will  an  examina- 
tion of  the  lower  forms  of  life  suffice  to  explain  the  higher?  Are 
we  to  explain  a  development  in  terms  of  its  lower  or  of  its  higher 
stages?  The  answer  to  these  questions  would  introduce  us  to 
one  of  the  main  points  at  issue  between  Hegelians  and  Spenceri- 
ans.  Here  it  must  suffice  to  say  that  the  idealists  undoubtedly 
have  the  best  of  the  argument.  We  can  only  know  what  man  is 
by  seeing  a  full-grown  human  being.  One  who  saw  a  child  could 
not  possibly  predict  what  he  would  become,  unless  he  had  already 
seen  one  that  had  become.  Study  of  the  acorn  would  not  lead  us 
to  a  knowledge  of  the  spreading  oak. 

This,  of  course,  does  not  mean  that  we  are  not  to  derive  all  the 
help  we  can  from  the  study  of  the  lower  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  that  w^hich  we  are  trying  to  interpret.  It  does  not  mean 
that  we  are  not  to  get  what  light  we  can  by  tracing  the  historic 
growth  of  the  moral  sentiments ;  nor  that  there  is  nothing  to  learn 
in  seeking  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God.  It  does  not  mean  that 
the  study  of  comparative  anatomy  is  unessential  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  human  body.  It  does  not  mean  that  a  knowledge  of  the 
process  will  not  help  us  to  an  understanding  of  the  product.  It 
only  means  that  antecedence  is  not  identical  with  causality,  and 
that  similarity  is  not  identity.  It  means  that,  having  traced  g 
back  toy,  and/* to  e,  and  so  on  back  to  a,  the  origin,  we  are  then 
to  find  the  key  to  the  process,  not  in  the  starting-point,  but  in  the 
whole  process  as  seen  from  the  end  to  the  beginning.  In  other 
words,  the  true  nature  of  anything  can  be  known,  not  from  the 
l^  00,  but  from  the  riXo;. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  does  not  mean  that,  because  wdiat  is 
last  in  time  may  be  first  in  thought,  we  are  therefore  first  to 
study  the  finished  product,  and  then  to  read  into  the  beginning  of 
the  process  everything  that  we  have  found  at  the  end;  that  we 
are  to  attribute  sensation  to  plants,  or  thought  to  shell-fish,  or 
conscience  to  birds  of  prey.     Professor  Drummond's  rhapsody  on 


452  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

the  death  of  tlie  flowers,  or  his  discovery  of  the  first  great  act  of 
the  moral  life  in  "  the  conscious  self-sacrifice  of  protoplastic  fis- 
sion," speaks  very  highly  for  his  poetic  imagination,  but  will  not 
increase  his  reputation  as  a  man  of  science.  It  may  be  worth  while 
to  remark  in  passing,  tliat,  while  it  is  customary  to  twit  theists  and 
Christian  theologians  with  making  their  God  in  their  own  image, 
the  anthropomorphism  wliich  does  this  (and  there  is  sufficient 
reason  for  it,  apart  from  Scripture)  is  nothing  to  the  anthropo- 
morphism which  attributes  to  plant  and  brute  creation  all  the 
characteristics  which  are  properly  distinctive  of  man.  It  may  be 
that  "man,  who  was  made  in  the  image  of  God,  was  also  made  in 
the  form  of  the  ape " ;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  ape,  or 
the  insect,  or  the  oyster  is  a  ^coop  ?.oyuop  -ohzaov  (pcWlvjlov. 

If,  for  example,  it  can  be  shown  that  conscience  in  man  pre- 
sents points  of  similarity  to  instinct  in  brutes,  it  by  no  means  fol- 
lows that  there  is  no  more  in  conscience  than  there  is  in  instinct, 
so  that  to  trace  the  former  back  to  the  latter  is  to  give  a  final  ex- 
planation of  the  idea  of  obligation.  It  makes  small  difi'erence 
whether  (with  Mr.  Spencer)  you  begin  with  instinct,  and  derive 
conscience  from  it,  or  whether  (with  Professor  Drummond),  start- 
ing from  the  other  end,  and  finding  moral  obligation  in  man,  you 
give  a  moral  value  to  the  instinctive  acts  of  brutes,  if,  after  all, 
conscience  and  instinct  are  only  different  names  for  the  same 
thing.  Most  certainly  they  are  not  the  same ;  and  we  cannot  see 
that  Professor  Drummond  gains  very  much  by  taking  his  science 
from  Mr.  Spencer  and  reading  it  backwards  by  the  light  of  Pro- 
fessor Caird's  evolutionary  philosophy,  while  practically  ignoring 
(though  he  quotes  Professor  Caird  at  length  on  this  very  point) 
what  is  just  here  the  most  important  point  of  all;  for,  as  Pro- 
fessor Caird  shows,  the  very  notion  of  development  should  carry 
with  it  the  implication  that  there  is  r/iore  in  the  later  steps  than 
there  was  in  tlie  earlier;  and  if  these  accretions  bring  with  them 
not  only  quantitative,  but  qualitative  additions  as  well,  as  un- 
doubtedly they  do,  it  is  obvious  that  what  may  have  been  an  ade- 
quate account  of  the  earlier  and  simpler  form  may  leave  untouched 
the  new  elements  which  have  come  in. 

The  bearing  of  this  on  Social  Evolution  is  not  far  to  seek.     It 


EVOLUTION.  453 

means  that  what  is  a  right  scientific  method  fur  one  branch  of  sci- 
ence, for  one  stage  in  a  development,  is  inadequate  for  another 
and  higher  stage.     No  one  would  assert  that  the  method  of  the 
pure  mathematician  would  suffice  for  the  chemist,  or  the  chemist's 
method  for  tlie  biologist.     Tlie   higher  sphere    implies  greater 
complexity,  new  factors  to  deal  with ;  hence,  changed  methods. 
Now,  with  the  advent  of  man  certain  new  factors  come  into  play, 
with  which  the  biologist  has  not  had  to  reckon.   These  are:  man's 
social  capacities,  his  reason,  and  his  religious  instincts.    Mr.  Kidd, 
indeed,  fully  recognizes  this,  and  is  at  great  pains  to  emphasize 
the  fact ;  yet,  so  far,  at  least,  as  method  is  concerned,  he  practically 
ignores  it ;  for  he  first  determines  what  are  the  conditions  of  pro- 
gress in  the  sphere  of  biology,  and  then  transfers  these  conditions 
bodily  from  biology  to  the  social  organism,  tacitly  assuming  that 
what  is  true  in  the  lower  sphere  is  necessarily  true  also  in  the 
higher,  which  by  no  means  follows.     It  by  no  means  necessarily 
follows,  for  instance,  that  because,  in  the  non-human  world,  pro- 
gress may  be  comprehensively  defined  in  terms  of  "  the  struggle 
for  existence,"  that  the  struggle  for  existence  is  the  sufficient  ex- 
planation of  progress  in  the  world  of  man.     It  is  rather  curious, 
however,  and,  perhaps,  worthy  of  remark,  that  this  very  idea  of 
*'the   struggle  for  existence"  was  first  suggested  to  Darwin  by 
reading  Malthus  On  Pajnilaiion  ;  so  that  now  Mr.  Kidd,  borrowing 
his  constructive  principle  from  biology,  and  applying  it  to  man  in 
society,  is  only  returning  to  Darwin's  starting-pokit. 

The  chief  peculiarity  of  Mr.  Kidd's  book  consists,  however,  not 
so  much  in  the  application  of  the  biological  method  to  man  in 
society— for  that  had  been  done  before— as  in  the  fact  that  he 
builds  upon  the  liypothesis  which  represents  the  most  advanced 
thought  at  the  present  time  in  biology.  The  biologists,  as  every 
one  knows,  are  divided  into  two  camps  in  regard  to  the  very  im- 
portant point  as  to  whether  or  not  inherited  characteristics  can  be 
transmitted.  If  they  can,  then  it  is  easy  to  see  how. Mr.  Spencer 
can  build  up  his  moral  system  on  the  principle  that  ethical  ideas 
grow  pari  passti  with,  the  development  of  society,  this  society  be- 
ing an  organism  so  constituted  that  the  interests  of  the  individual 
members  of  it  and  the  general  interest  of  the  whole  tend  to  come 


454  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

into  equilibrium.  Altruism  is  not  only  as  natural  as  egoism,  but 
it  is  as  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the  individual.  The  Weis- 
mannists,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasize  the  idea  of  struggle ;  they 
admit  no  disinterested,  altruistic  actions,  scarcely  even  coopera- 
tion. Here  we  have  a  fundamental  difference  of  much  signifi- 
cance upon  a  point  as  to  which  few  of  us  have  any  right  to  an 
opinion.  Here  the  roads  part,  and  it  is,  obviously,  of  the  greatest 
consequence  which  one  we  choose  to  follow.  If  sociology  be  only 
"  biology  'writ  large,' "  it  makes  all  the  difierence  in  the  world  to  the 
former  what  the  small  letters  spell.  If  the  foundations  are  utterly 
dissimilar,  the  superstructures  cannot  present  the  same  propor- 
tions. What  are  we  to  do  when  the  doctors  of  science  disagree ; 
when,  for  example.  Professor  Huxley  and  Mr.  Kidd  define  pro- 
gress in  terms  of  "  the  struggle  for  life,"  and  tell  us  that  there  is 
nothing  ethical  about  nature;  that  "the  cosmic  process  has  no 
sort  of  relation  to  moral  ends";  that  ''the  imitation  of  it  by  man 
is  inconsistent  with  the  first  principles  of  ethics";  while  Mr. 
Spencer  and  Professor  Drummond,  making  much  of  altruism  and 
the  struggle  for  the  life  of  others,  would  teach  us  that  "  all  nature 
is  on  the  side  of  the  man  who  tries  to  rise,"  and  that  nature  is 
"  henceforth  to  become  the  ethical  teacher  of  the  world  "  ?  If  the 
temple  of  truth  in  the  sphere  of  social  science  is  to  be  builded 
upon  the  foundations  of  biology,  we  fear  that  the  time  has  not 
yet  come.  Until  there  is  more  agreement  than  at  present  exists 
among  naturalists,  they  can  scarcely  contribute  much  toward  the 
solution  of  social  problems.  "Physician,  lieal  thyself."  If  the 
Weismannists  are  wrong,  it  is  obvious  that  many  of  Mr.  Kidd's 
conclusions  must  be  vitiated  for  us  at  the  start,  since  he  builds 
his  entire  system  upon  their  (as  yet  unproved)  hypothesis,  unless 
the  results  he  reaches  can  be  separated  from  his  method;  and 
this,  I  think,  is  to  some  extent  possible.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  me 
that  his  book  is  valuable  just  in  proportion  as  it  is  possible  to 
separate  its  results  from  the  method  employed  in  reaching  them, 
and  that  most  of  the  author's  paradoxes  result  just  from  an  im- 
perfect method. 

For  suppose  we  admit  that  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection  is 
sufiicient  to  account  for  progress  from  the  beginning  up  to  and 


kidd's  social  evolution.  455 

including  man  the  individual,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  this  prin- 
ciple will  apply  to  man  in  society.  Mr.  Kidd  assumes  that  society 
is  an  organism;  but,  if  so,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  interests 
of  the  individual  can  always  be  antagonistic  to  the  interests  of 
the  organism,  and  vice  versa^  as  Mr.  Kidd  says  they  are.  "We  do 
not  so  reason  in  regard  to  other  organisms.  Physicans  endeavor 
to  build  up  the  system,  in  order  to  overcome  local  disorders;  and, 
<jonversely,  inflammation  or  disease  of  the  members  affects  the 
health  of  the  whole  body.  So,  also,  the  different  parts  are  de- 
pendent upon  eacli  other.  ''The  eye  cannot  say  unto  the  hand,  I 
have  no  need  of  thee ;  nor  the  head  to  the  feet,  I  have  no  need  of 
you."  Here  Mr.  Spencer,  who  was  in  this  particular  point  antici- 
pated by  Paul,  is  certainly  more  self -consistent  than  Mr.  Kidd. 

Again,  Mr.  Kidd  assumes  that  the  interests  of  the  organism  are 
of  paramount  importance,  and  that  it  does  not  matter  about  the 
individual,  except,  of  course,  to  the  individual  himself.  We 
need  some  one  to  show  that  the  organism  exists  for  the  individual, 
as  well  as  the  individual  for  the  organism ;  and  certainly,  on  the 
basis  of  a  materialistic  evolution,  this  would  seem  to  be  more 
logical  and  natural:  for,  if  there  be  no  intelligence  back  of  the 
process  for  which  the  organism  could  be  said  to  exist,  then 
man  is  the  highest  intelligence  in  the  universe,  and  it  is  right 
that  he  sliould  be  regarded  as  the  end  for  which  the  universe  ex- 
ists, the  goal  toward  which  the  cosmic  process  has  been  working. 
It  would  seem  strange  to  make  the  highest  life  in  the  universe 
subordinate  to  a  life  such  as  tliat  manifested  in  an  unteleological 
cosmic  process.  If  the  individual  exists  for  the  organism,  this 
theory  needs  a  God,  a  Higher  Intelligence,  to  help  it  out;  other- 
wise what  is  highest  in  the  order  of  life  would  be  only  means  to 
end:  intellect,  spirit,  will,  would  be  the  servants  of  matter. 

If,  however,  it  be  said  that  the  individual  exists,  not  as  subor- 
dinate to  an  unintelligent  cosmic  process,  but  as  a  part,  a  member 
of  society,  and  that  it  is  the  social  organism  as  constituted  ])y  in- 
dividuals, and  not  the  individuals  tliemselves,  that  is  of  import- 
ance, then  it  may  be  asked :  Why  am  not  I  as  worthy  of  consid- 
eration as  my  neighbor?  Why  should  I  consider  the  organism 
with   its  future   unborn   millions?     My  own   interests,   my  own 


456  THE  PRESBYTERIAN    QUARTERLY. 

pleasure  and  happiness,  are  of  as  much  account  as  the  happiness 
of  the  human  beings  who  shall  live  five  hundred  or  five  thousand 
years  hence.  In  other  words,  we  find  here  the  same  antinomy 
that  exists  between  egoistic  and  universalistic  hedonism.  If  you 
define  conduct  in  terms  of  pleasure  and  pain  merely,  it  is  difficult 
to  make  the  transition  from  one's  self  to  one's  neighbor.  When 
individual  and  social  interests  are  harmonious,  well  and  good; 
there  is  then  a  rational  sanction  for  conduct  in  the  nature  of 
things.  But  suppose  interests  clash.  Humanity  is  the  fruit  and 
flower  of  nature,  the  highest  life  in  the  universe,  the  end  toward 
which  nature  has  been  striving;  but  why  one  man  rather  tlian 
another?  Why  my  neighbor  rather  than  myself?  As  we  shall 
see  later,  Mr.  Kidd  feels  this  difficulty,  and,  in  order  to  solve  it, 
he  is  forced  either  to  abandon  materialism,  or  to  dethrone  reason. 
Even  Mr.  Spencer  admits  that  "the  welfare  of  the  species  is  an 
end  to  be  subserved  only  as  subserving  the  welfare  of  individu- 
als." "  But,"  he  adds,  "  since  disappearance  of  the  species,  imply- 
ing absolute  disappearance  of  all  individuals,  involves  absolute 
failure  in  achieving  the  end,  whereas  disappearance  of  individu- 
als, though  carried  to  a  great  extent,  may  leave  outstanding  such 
numbers  as  can,  by  continuance  of  the  species,  make  subsequent 
fulfihnent  of  the  end  possible,  the  preservation  of  the  individual 
must,  in  a  variable  degree  according  to  circumstances,  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  preservation  of  the  species,  where  the  two  conflict." 
In  this  statement  it  is  to  1)0  noticed,  ia  the  first  place,  that  though 
preservation  of  the  species  is  enjoined,  this  is  only  in  order  that, 
though  many  individuals  may  disappear,  other  individuals  may 
remain  to  fulfil  their  ends.  It  is,  after  all,  the  individual  that  is 
of  paramount  importance.  In  the  second  place,  Mr.  Spencer  has 
here  brought  in  a  new  element,  namely,  the  end.  What,  then,  is 
the  end?  It  is  the  welfare  of  individuals.  It  can,  indeed,  never 
be  anything  else.  But  there  we  are  back  at  the  old  question. 
Why  the  welfare  of  one  individual  rather  than  of  another?  Still 
further,  suppose  you  say  that  this  welfare  is  not  happiness,  but 
self-development;  or  suppose  jou  say  that  it  merely  is  spiritual 
growth — "that  ye  may  have  life,  and  may  have  it  more  abun- 
dantly": then  we  may  hold  that  the  kind  of  life  which  we  iden- 


kidd's  social  evolution.  4:57 


tify  with  spiritual  growth  would  facilitate  the  preservation  of  the 
species.  We  do  hold  that;  wo  should  quite  agree  with  Mr. 
Leslie  Stephen  in  refusing  to  recognize  as  mural  such  conduct  as 
could  be  shown  to  lead  to  the  extinction  of  the  species:  Init  that 
is  a  very  different  thing  from  saying  that  the  preservation  of  the 
species  is  the  end.  It  would  seem  to  be  necessary  to  determine 
what  the  end  of  conduct  or  of  life  is,  before  laying  down  rules 
looking  to  the  attainment  of  that  end.  And  here,  again,  a  meta- 
physic,  a  theory  of  the  universe,  is  involved;  and  it  ought  not  to 
be' quietly  assumed  that  economic  or  social  progress  is  the  end  for 
which  nature  is  striving.  ^    ^ 

We  can  better  understand  how  those  who  put  a  spiritualistic 
construction  upon  the  universe  should  make  the  individual  subor- 
dinate to  the  organism,  for  in  that  case  the  whole  cosmic  process, 
the  whole  world  of  nature,  inorganic,  organic,  human,  all  would  be 
but  the  visible  manifestation  of  spiritual  life;  the  whole  universe 
of  mind  and  matter  would  exist  through  and  for  the  spirit  back 
of  things— very  much  as  the  Calvinist  says  that  all  things  exist 
for  the  glory  of  God.  Man  in  this  case  might  be,  as  it  were,  but 
a  button  on  the  garment  of  Deity,  and,  as  such,  of  infinitely  less 
importance  than  the  garment  itself.  The  garment  would  exist 
for  the  wearer ;  the  button  would  exist  for  the  garment. 

But  it  is  not  true.  Professor  Haeckel  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing, that  it  is  dualism  which  gives  an  anthropocentric  con- 
struction to  the  universe.     On  the  contrary,  it  is  only  a  material- 
istic monism  which  can  assert  that  "man  is  the  central  point  of 
the  universe,  the  last  and  highest  final  cause  of  creation,  and  that 
the  rest  of  nature  was  created .  merely  for  the  purpose  of  servmg 
man."     (Moiiism,  p.  14.)     This  is  at  least  as  bad  theology  as  it  is 
bad  science.     Paul  and  the  Hebrew  prophets  were  as  violently 
opposed  to  the  anthropocentric  view  as  were  Darwin  and  Coper- 
nicus, though  the  latter  names,  no  doubt,  carried  more  weight, 
speaking  as  they  did   in  the  name  of  science,  while  the  former 
spoke  only  by  inspiration  of  the  Most  High.     Dualism  may  teach 
that  the  individual  man  is  of  greater  consequence  than  the  sum  of 
all  the  elements  that  enter  into  his  non-human  environment;  but 
it  does  not  teach  "that  the  rest  of  nature  was  created  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  serving  man." 


458  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

So  much  as  to  method.  What  are  the  results  according  to  Mr. 
Kidd  of  the  application  of  these  principles?  I  shall  state  them 
very  briefly.  In  the  first  place,  then,  the  life  of  man  is  a  con- 
tinual straggle  for  existence,  liis  own  interests  being  invariably 
antagonistic  to  the  interests  of  the  social  organism  of  which  he 
forms  a  part.  "We  have  a  rational  creature  whose  reason  is 
itself  one  of  the  leading  factors  in  the  progress  he  is  making,  but 
who  is  nevertheless  subject,  in  common  with  all  other  forms  of 
life,  to  certain  organic  laws  of  existence  which  render  his  progress 
impossible  in  any  other  way  than  by  submitting  to  conditions  that 
can  never  have  any  ultimate  sanction  in  his  reason."  "  If  pro- 
gress is  to  continue,  the  individual  must  be  compelled  to  submit 
to  conditions  of  existence  of  the  most  onerous  kind,  which,  to  all 
appearace,  his  reason  actually  gives  him  the  power  to  suspend-r— 
and  all  to  further  a  development  in  which  he  has  not,  and  in 
which  he  never  can  have,  qua  individual,  the  slightest  practical 
interest." 

And  yet,  strange  to  say,  man  has  not  ceased  to  make  progress. 
He  has  persistently  disregarded  the  voice  of  reason  telling  him 
to  look  out  for  himself.  How  do  we  explain  this  strange  resistance 
on  the  part  of  man  to  the  urging  of  reason  and  interest  com- 
bined ?  Mr.  Kidd  answers  it  is  to  be  explained  by  the  phenomena 
of  religion.  Religious  belief  is  the  integrating  force  in  the  social 
organism,  and  provides  "a  sanction  for  social  conduct  which  is 
always  of  necessity  ultra-rational,  and  the  function  of  which  is  to 
secure  in  the  stress  of  evolution  the  continual  subordination  of 
the  interests  of  the  individual  units  to  the  larger  interests  of  the 
longer-lived  social  organism  to  which  they  belong."  In  other 
words,  reason  teaches  pure  individualism,  selfishness,  which  w^ould 
put  an  end  to  progress.  Yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  progress  has 
been  continuous,  and  is  bound  to  continue.  This  is  owing  to  the 
subordination  of  individual  interests  to  the  wider  social  interests. 
Egoism  lias  given  way  to  altruism,  because  religion  has  taught 
the  latter  and  has  enforced  its  teaching  with  positive  sanctions. 
Yet  these  sanctions  have  themselves  no  foundation  in  reason. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  rational  religion.  "A  rational  re- 
ligion is  a  scientific  impossibility."     What,  then,  does  Mr.  Kidd 


459 

mean  by  saying  tliat  tliere  is  no  sncli  thing  as  a  rational  religion  ? 
There  is  certainly  clumshiess  of  statement,  if  not  confusion  of 
thought,  here.  How,  in  the  first  place,  if  one  be  a  thorough-going 
Weismannist,  can  there  be  for  such  an  one  any  such  thing  as  a  su- 
pernatural sanction?  For  does  not  Weismannism  just  mean  that 
everything  that  is  has  come  to  be  simply  through  the  working  of 
the  cosmic  process — the  grinding  of  the  wheels  of  nature — and 
are  not  our  ideas,  then,  even  our  idea  of  tlie  supernatural,  simplj' 
the  product,  and  at  tlie  same  time  a  part,  of  this  process?  Cer- 
tain arrangements  of  the  molecules  of  matter  have  at  last  pro- 
duced mind — or,  let  us  say,  rather,  ideas,  thoughts — for  mind 
itself  is  only  a  series  of  thought-images  strung  togetlier — "a 
series  of  feelings  aware  of  itself."  Now  what  right  have  these 
ideas,  these  simple  products  of  a  mechanical  process  which  dis- 
tributes and  arranges  matter  in  space — what  riglit  have  tliese 
misbegotten  little  creatures  to  tell  us  to  believe  in  something  out- 
side or  beyond  (supernatural)  the  cosmic  process  (nature)  which 
has  given  them  birth,  whose  they  are  and  whom  they  serve  ?  In 
short,  if  you  start  with  an  empirical  theory  of  knowledge,  how 
can  you  ever  get  beyond  the  world  of  sight  and  sound  and  taste 
and  smell?  Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  another  way,  if  AVeis- 
mannism  is  materialistic,  it  would  make  the  cosmic  process  sum 
up  and  include  the  universe.  Nature  would  embrace  everything 
that  has  been,  is,  and  will  be.  How,  then  could  there  be  any- 
thing beyond  what  is  everything — any  supernatural  ? '  We,  indeed, 
are  not  warranted  in  asserting  that  Weismannism  is  necessarily 
materialistic.  Weismann  himself  tells  us  that  "  the  mechanical 
conception  of  nature  very  well  admits  of  being  united  with  a 
teleological  conception  of  the  universe,"  and  that  '^without  teleo- 
logy there  would  be  no  mechanism."  "The  consciousness,"  he 
says,  "that  behind  that  mechanism  of  the  universe  which  is  alone 
comprehensible  to  us  there  still  lies  an  incomprehensible  teleo- 

^  Mr.  Kidd  says,  in  the  Niueteeuth  Century  article  above  cited,  that  it  was  his 
purpose  "to  state  in  simple,  scientific  terms,  and  witJwut  the  necessity  for  starting 
with  any  equipment  of  teleological  assumption,  that  which  presents  itself  to  me  [him] 
as  a  natural  law  of  human  evolution  hitherto  unenunciated."  But  it  is  one  pur- 
pose of  this  article  to  indicate  that  such  a  simple  limitation  of  the  subject  as  Mr. 
Kidd  proposes  is  impossible. 


460  THE  PRESBYTERIAN   QUARTERLY. 

logical  universal  cause,  necessitates  quite  a  different  conception  of 
the  universe — a  conception  absolutely  opposed  to  that  of  the  ma- 
terialist." This  is  plain  enough;  the  mechanism  of  natural  phe- 
nomena may  be  but  the  manifestation  of  the  plan  of  an  intelli- 
gent first  cause — may  be  "purpose"  externalized  and  made  to  live 
in  space,  as  it  existed  before  only  in  thought.  But  Weismann 
does  not  say  that  he  himself  believes  in  the  existence  of  this 
"Universal  Cause."  What  he  does  make  clear  is  the  statement 
that  if  there  be  any  directive  power  in  the  universe  "  we  must 
not  imagine  this  to  interfere  directly  in  the  mechanism  of  the 
universe,  but  to  be  rather  behind  the  latter  as  the  final  cause  of 
this  mechanism."  The  fact  of  the  existence  of  matter  and  of  the 
laws  which  govern  it,  does  not  satisfy  our  intellectual  need  for 
causality,  and  if  we  choose  to  assume  a  universal  cause  under- 
lying the  laws  of  nature,  no  one  could  show  that  such  assumption 
is  erroneous.  But  we  can  not  prove  that  there  is  any  "spiritual 
first  cause  of  the  universe,"  and  if  there  be,  it  is  inconceivable  in 
its  nature,  and  of  it  we  can  say  only  one  thing  with  certainty, 
namely,  that  it  must  be  teleological.  But  it  is  certain  that 
directive  power  and  mechanical  causes  cannot  work  together.  In 
other  words,  if  there  be  any  teleology  in  the  universe  it  must  re- 
side in  the  mechanic  who  made  the  machine  and  set  it  going;  but 
the  machine  once  set  in  motion,  cannot  have  crank,  lever,  or  screw- 
pin  touched  from  without.  It  cannot  be  oiled  or  regulated  in 
any  way.  To  do  this  would  stop  the  natural  working  of  its 
wheels.  This  God  the  clock-maker  theory  of  the  universe  is 
not  atheistic.  It  is  nineteenth  century  scientific  Deism ;  but  so 
far  as  its  practical  bearing  on  morality  is  concerned,  we  may 
doubt  whether  it  is  so  very  much  better  tlian  atheism.  If,  more- 
over, Weismann  be  asked  "whether  the  development  of  the  mind 
can  be  conceived  as  resulting  from  purely  mechanical  laws,"  he 
answers  "unhesitatingly  with  the  pure  materialist,"  though  he 
does  not  agree  with  him  as  to  the  manner  in  which  he  derives 
mental  phenomena  from  matter,  but  would  rather,  as  Haeckel  does, 
attribute  consciousness  to  matter.  Further  than  this,  in  his  theory 
of  knowledge  he  is  agnostic.  His  essay  sums  up  to  this :  that  if 
there  be  any  teleological  power  in  the  universe  it  can  only  be  con- 


KIDD  S  SOCIAL  EVOLUTION. 


461 


ceived  of  as  a  first  cause,  Init  by  no  means  as  a  "  pliyletic  vital 
force"  or  directive  power.  Thus  conceiving  of  it,  it  would  not 
be  inconsistent  with  the  mechanical  conception  of  nature,  but  its 
existence  can  only  be  assumed,  not  proved/ 

Oar  author's  position  is  much  les3  definite  than  his  master's, 
and  we  can  only  judge  his  vague  statements  on  this  point  by  their 
implications.  We  may,  therefore,  ask:  if  tlie  mechanical  concep- 
tion of  nature  be  not  inconsistent  with  teleology ;  i.  e.,  in  other 
words,  with  the  belief  that  there  is  a  plan  back  of  the  develop- 
mental process,  this  plan  implying  intelligence,  and  religion  being 
but  the  belief  in  and  feeling  of  dependence  upon  this  supreme 
intelligence,  how,  then,  can  religion  be  irrational?  Teleology 
implies  a  plan.  A  plan  implies  the  existence  of  an  intelligent 
beincr.  If  there  be  such  a  being  it  cannot  be  irrational  to  hold 
that  he  exists,  with  whatever  implications,  moral  or  otherwise, 
such  a  belief  would  involve.  Professor  Drummond  tells  us  that 
<' instead  of  giving  up  nature  and  reason  ....  Mr.  Kidd  should 
have  given  up  Darwin."  Perhaps;  but  allowing  him  to  keep 
Darwin,  if  he  would  only  concede  the  rationality  of  religion  the 
whole  thing  would  work  out  simply  enough. 

Mr.  Kidd  insists  that  the  essential  element  in  all  religions  is  the 
conception  of  the  supernatural.  Here  he  undoubtedly  strikes  at 
the  root  of  the  matter,  and  his  discussion  of  this  point  cannot  be 
too  highly  praised.  The  chapter  in  which  he  pictures  the  visit  of 
an  inhabitant  of  another  planet  to  our  western  civilization  and 
describes  the  impression  produced  upon  the  visitor  by  the  various 
phenomena  connected  with  our  religious  life,  and  the  chapter  on 
"the  function  of  religious  beliefs  in  the  evolution  of  society," 
are  both  admirable.  We  need  not  pause  to  question  his  right  to 
impose  his  own  meaning  on  the  phrase  "social  organism,"  nor  to 
remark  upon  his  somewhat  clumsy  definition  of  religion— perhaps 
any  one  is  foolish  to  attempt  to  define  religion— and  perhaps  Mr. 
Kidd's  definitions  are  adequate  for  the  purpose  he  has  in  view. 
Neither  shall  we  pause  to  inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  word 
progress— important  as  such  an  inquiry  is— it  would  take  us  too 

1  Weismann,  essay  on  ''The  Mechanical  Conception  of  Nature,"  in  Studies  in 
the  Theory  of  Descent,  Vol.  1. 


462  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

far  afield.  Mr.  Kicld  uses  tlie  word  to  indicate  a  change  of  social 
conditions,  to  signify  the  difference,  c.  g.^  between  society  as  it  is 
to-day,  and  as  it  was,  say  a  century  or  ten  centuries  ago.  Such  an 
idea  of  progress  as  this  invites  scrutiny,  analysis.  Is  mere  change 
of  external  conditions,  mode  of  life,  complexity  of  social  intercourse, 
progress?  What  is  progress?  Does  it  imply  that  the  sum  total 
of  happiness  is  greater  than  formerly  ?  or  of  wealth  ?  Has  pro- 
gress any  moral  quality  ?  or  intellectual  ?  or  is  it  merely  economic? 
These  are  interesting  and  important  questions,  but  Mr.  Kidd  does 
not  touch  upon  them.  For  our  present  purpose  it  is,  however, 
sufficient  that  with  his  fundamental  contention  at  this  point  we 
are  in  most  hearty  agreement;  the  contention,  viz.,  that  ethical 
systems  always  have  rested,  and  do  rest,  upon  the  supernatural 
sanctions  of  religious  belief,  and  that  progress  has  been  due  to 
the  conduct  imposed  by  these  sanctions.  So  much  is  clear  and 
strong.     Tliis  is  a  tremendous  concession  to  religion. 

But  what  does  Mr.  Kidd  mean  when  he  says  that  religion  is 
irrational?  Does  he  only  mean  that  religion  leads  us  into  a  world 
where  the  pure  reason  fails  to  penetrate  ?  If  so,  he  only  holds 
with  the  schoolmen  who  said :  Fides  non  est  contra  rationern^  seel 
supra  rationem.  There  may  be  rational  grounds  for  the  belief  in 
the  supernatural,  though  that  belief  carries  with  it  certain  ultra- 
rational  implications.  Or,  does  Mr.  Kidd  mean  that  the  belief  in 
the  supernatural,  upon  which  such  great  issues  hang,  is  itself  con- 
trary to  the  dictates  of  reason?  It  is  impossible  to  tell  what  he 
himself  liolds.  For  a  man  who  pretends  to  scientific  accuracy, 
his  use  of  the  words  "rational,"  "irrational,"  "ultra-rational"  and 
"  supernatural,"  is  bewilderingly  vague.  If  he  is  intentionally  non- 
committal, as  his  statement  that  "  the  question  of  real  importance 
is  not  whether  ....  these  beliefs  are  without  any  foundation  in 
reason,  but  whether  religious  systems  have  a  function  to  perform 
in  the  evolution  of  society,"  would  seem  to  imply,  he  has  suc- 
ceeded admirably  in  his  effort  to  involve  this  point  in  obscurity. 
But  the  point  cannot  be  tlius  evaded.  If  it  be  said  that  Mr.  Kidd 
means  right  and  that  in  making  him  pronounce  belief  in  the  su- 
pernatural to  be  contrary  to  reason  we  are  only  setting  up  a 
straw-man  for  a  target,  the  answer  is,  that  we  have  no  desire  to 


zidd's  social  evolution.  463 

misrepresent  Mr.  Kidd,  but  only  to  demand  consistency  and  clear- 
ness upon  a  very  important  point.  For  it  is  not  enough  to  say 
that  religious  beliefs  '^must  have  some  immense  utilitarian  func- 
tion to  perform  in  the  evolution  which  is  proceeding."  This  is 
good  as  far  as  it  goes,  and  instead  of  saying  that  religion  is  irra- 
tional, we  would  make  this  concession  serve  as  an  argument  for 
the  reasonableness  of  the  belief  in  the  supernatural;  i.  <?.,  just  as 
Kant  founded  a  moral  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  on 
the  necessity  of  finding  a  supernatural  sanction  for  individual 
conduct,  so  we  would  say  that  the  necessity  that  the  social  organi- 
ism  is  under  of  finding  a  supernatural  sanction  for  such  conduct  as 
will  insure  its  continued  life  and  progress  is  ijyso  facto  an  argu- 
ment for  the  rationality  of  that  sanction;  unless,  indeed,  progress 
itself  be  irrational.  But  if  progress  be  a  good  (as  I  take  it  all 
evolutionists  must  hold)  then  that  which  makes  it  possible  must 
be  a  good,  which  the  belief  in  tlie  supernatural  can  scarcely  be 
if  it  is  founded  on  a  lie.  This  is  another  of  Mr.  Kidd's  paradoxes. 
He  states  the  same  thought  in  another  way  when  he  says:  "The 
most  distinctive  feature  of  human  evolution  as  a  whole  is  that 
through  the  operation  of  the  law  of  natural  selection  the  race 
must  o:row  ever  more  and  more  relii>;ious."  We  do  not  know  liow 
much  Mr.  Kidd  was  striving  after  effect  in  stating  the  matter  in 
this  way,  but  to  those  who  have  regarded  the  Darwinian  hypothesis 
as  the  sworn  enemy  of  supernatural  religion  this  statement  is  suffi- 
ciently striking. 

Still,  the  real  question  is,  not  whether  a  belief  in  the  super- 
natural is  necessary  to  social  progress,  but  whether  there  is 
rational  ground  for  such  belief.  Mr.  Kidd  shows  small  appre- 
ciation of  the  subject  when  he  says  that  "  this  is  not  the  question 
at  issue  at  all."  For  suppose,  in  explaining  the  phenomena  of 
religion,  you  explain  religion  away.  The  well-being  and  progress 
of  society  in  the  past  and  in  the  present  has  been  dependent  upon 
a  morality  conditioned  by  supernatural  sanctions.  But  how  long 
will  these  sanctions  prove  binding  when  they  are  shown  to  be 
irrational?  "Will  men  fear  God  if  they  believe  that  he  is  dead,  or 
that  he  sleepeth,  or  is  gone  on  a  journey?  Men  have  hitherto 
believed  in  religions  and  acted  under  their  sanctions.  How  did 
31 


464:  THE  PRESBYTERIAIf  QUARTERLY. 

they  come  to  have  these  beliefs?  If  you  can  explain  the  belief 
in  the  supernatural  in  a  naturalistic  way,  you  may  satisfy  the  de- 
mands of  the  historic  spirit  by  showing  how  these  things  came  to 
be,  but  you  may  at  the  same  time  leave  nothing  to  believe  in  ex- 
cept the  belief  that  belief  is  impossible.  "We  are  in  hearty  sym- 
pathy with  Mr.  Kidd  in  his  "impatience  at  the  triviality  and 
comparative  insignificance  of  the  explanation  offered"  by  Mr. 
Spencer  to  account  for  our  religious  beliefs.  But  on  this  funda- 
mental point  Spencer's  position  is  luminous  with  insight  compared 
with  Mr.  Kidd's.  If  Spencer,  in  accounting  for  the  genesis  of 
our  religious  ideas,  explains  them  away,  he  at  least  does  not  at- 
tempt to  rear  the  structure  of  his  ethical  system  upon  the  baseless 
fabric  of  a  vision.  On  the  contrary,  he  tells  us  that  it  is  his 
specific  object  to  establish  rules  of  conduct  on  a  scientific  basis, 
independent  of  all  religious  sanctions.  Whether  he  succeeds  in 
doing  so  is  another  question.  But  it  is  beyond  conjecture  how 
Mr.  Kidd,  of  all  men,  holding  as  he  does  to  the  religious  basis  of 
morality,  of  all  altruistic  action,  holding  that  "  if  our  conscious 
relationship  to  the  universe  is  measured  by  the  brief  span  of  in- 
dividual existence,  then  the  intellect  can  know  of  orly  one  duty 
in  the  individual,  namely,  his  duty  to  himself  to  make  the  most 
of  the  few  precious  years  of  consciousness  he  can  ever  know," 
holding  that  without  a  supernatural  sanction  for  conduct  self- 
indulgence  would  reign  supreme,  and  that  nations,  by  neglecting 
the  moral  law,  which  is  the  law  of  progress,  and  which  is  founded 
upon  the  sanctions  of  religion,  would  degenerate  and  disappear; 
holding  all  this  as  the  teaching  of  science,  it  is  beyond  conjecture, 
I  say,  how  he  can  regard  it  as  beside  the  question  whether  or  not 
these  religious  beliefs  have  any  foundation  in  reason. 

Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  that  alike  the  fundamental  weakness 
and  the  greatest  strength  of  Social  Evolution  lie  right  here :  its 
greatest  strength  in  the  recognition  of  tlie  necessity  of  religion  as 
a  social  factor ;  its  fundamental  weakness,  more  serious  even  than 
the  building  of  the  whole  argument  upon  an  unproved  hypothesis, 
in  the  position  the  author  takes  in  regard  to  the  rationality  of  re- 
ligion ;  for  this  is  to  build  upon  foundations  of  sand.  It  is  to  saw 
off  the  limb  on  which  he  is  sitting.     For  to  what,  after  all,  does 


465 

his  contention  come?  Simply  to  this:  that  what  has  been,  will 
be ;  that  because  religious  systems  have  hitherto  been  necessary  to 
the  working  of  the  cosmic  process  in  the  various  stages  of  social 
development,  therefore  they  will  continue  to  play  the  important 
part  in  the  future  that  they  have  played  in  the  past,  because  with- 
out them  social  progress  could  not  continue.  But  why,  we  may 
ask,  should  progress  continue  ?  And  if  it  does  continue,  whither 
is  it  tending?  What  is  the  goal,  the  end,  the  aim?  This,  again, 
is  a  question  of  metaphysics,  and  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  bio- 
logical method.  So  true  is  it  that  we  cannot  learn  from  nature — 
i.  e.,  external,  mechanical  nature — alone,  but  must  bring  with  us 
to  nature  the  clue  to  its  interpretation.  So  far  as  the  present  in- 
quiry is  concerned,  it  is  sufficient  that  reason  and  religion  made 
tlieir  advent  together,  and  have  always  existed  side  by  side,  some- 
times in  harmonious  cooperation,  sometimes  in  friendly  rivalry; 
now  in  armed  neutrality  and  again  in  open  conflict,  but  still  to- 
gether. Man  has  universally  been  a  religious  animal,  and  has 
acted  under  supernatural  sanctions.  But,  now,  suppose  you  de- 
rationalize  religion,  destroying  the  supernatural  sanctions  of  con- 
duct, what  will  happen?  One  of  two  things,  either  progress  will 
stop  or  it  must  go  forward  UJider  new  conditions.  We  cannot 
say  that  either  alternative  is  a  2^^'iori  impossible.  Because  a  cer- 
tain thing  has  been  is  no  guarantee  that  it  will  continue  eternally. 
Astronomers  tell  us  that  the  planets  are  burning  themselves  out. 
If  so,  the  time  must  come  when  they  can  no  longer  support  life. 
Progress,  therefore,  in  the  sense  in  which  we  now  use  the  word, 
could  not  be  everlasting,  and  man  must  be  destined  sooner  or  later 
to  disappear  from  tlie  face  of  the  earth.  This  period  may  be  dis- 
tant by  millions  of  years.  It  may  be  that  we  are  destined  to  go 
on  developing  a  higher  civilization,  a  more  perfect  humanity,  "for 
a  period  longer  than  that  now  covered  by  history."  We  may 
realize  many  of  the  lofty  visions  of  the  future  which  Mr.  Frede- 
ric Harrison  so  eloquently  pictures,  even  though  they  do  not 
come  to  pass  under  the  religion  of  humanity.  But  we  have  no 
guarantee  of  this.  The  bloom  of  the  flower  is  of  short  duration 
compared  with  the  life  of  the  plant  which  bears  it.  And  so  the 
flower  of  our  civilization  may  endure  but  for  a  moment  in  com- 


466  THE  FRESBrrERIAN  QUARTEKLT. 

parison  with  the  infinitely  longer  life  of  the  world  in  w^hich  we 
live.  What  guarantee  have  we  that  nature,  which  has  hitherto 
been  as  cruel  to  "the  type"  as  she  has  been  to  the  individual,  will 
act  more  kindly  toward  man  than  toward  the  countless  species 
that  have  forever  vanished?  Hitherto  the  disappearing  type  has 
but  vanished  in  yielding  to  a  higher  type,  one  better  adapted  to 
its  environments.  But  some  day  the  zenith  of  ascent  will  be 
reached,  and  by  the  reverse  process  the  descent  toward  the  nadir 
will  begin. 

"Many  an  feon  moulded  earth  before  her  highest,  man,  was  born; 
Many  an  ccon,  too,  may  pass  when  earth  is  mauless  and  forlorn." 

The  fact  that  man  had  outgrown  religion  might  indicate  that 
in  the  next  stage  of  the  world's  history,  for  that  "crowning  race" 
of  whom  the  poet  speaks,  morality  might  be  fostered  under  new 
conditions,  and  without  the  aid  of  supernatural  sanctions;  but  it 
might  just  as  w^ell  indicate  that  with  the  loss  of  religious  faith 
would  begin  the  decay  of  morality  and  the  general  reverse  pro- 
cess.    Who  shall  say  that  the  first  step  toward  the  time  when 

"Many  a  planet  by  many  a  sun  may  roll  with  the  dust  of  a  vanished  race" 

may  not  be  taken  with  the  derationalizing  of  religion  ?  The  pen- 
dulum has  swung  to  the  end  of  its  reach;  it  may  now  swing  back. 
The  onward  movement  has  thus  far  had  a  certain  impetus,  a  pro- 
pelling force,  back  of  it ;  take  that  away,  and  may  the  movement 
not  cease?  Certainly  it  may;  nay,  it  inevitably  must  cease  unless 
some  new  impetus  be  found  to  take  the  place  of  the  old  one. 
Electricity  might  take  the  place  of  steam,  but  the  engine  could 
not  run  without  any  motive  power  whatever.  Everybody,  appar- 
ently, recognizes  this  fact,  except  Mr.  Kidd.  Hence  it  is  that 
serious-minded,  thinking  men  who  have  lost  their  own  religious 
faith  and  are  trying  to  rob  the  rest  of  the  world  of  theirs,  are 
endeavoring  in  various  ways  to  provide  a  substitute  for  that 
which  has  been  lost.  Hence,  too,  it  is  that  we,  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  either  the  rationality  or  the  practical  efficacy  of  any  of 
these  substitutes,  tenaciously  cling  to,  and  zealously  defend,  that 
belief  in  the  supernatural  which  always  has  been,  and  which,  it 
seems  to  us,  always  will  be,  the  only  rational  sanction  for  moral- 


•  kidd's  social  evolution.  467 

itj  and  the  only  hope  for  the  liuman  race.  Professor  Huxley 
pitting  the  microcosm  against  the  macrocosm,  and  giving  the 
youth  not  even  a  shng  with  which  to  fight  against  the  giant;  Mr. 
Frederic  Harrison  bidding  us  worship  humanity,  and  Professor 
Huxle}^  replying  tliat  he  would  as  soon  worship  a  wilderness  of 
apes;  Mr.  Spencer  resolving  our  gods  into  ghosts,  and  telling  us 
that  duty  and  pleasure  tend  to  become  identical,  though  right  be 
only  conformity  to  custom ;  Professor  Drummond  following  Mr. 
Spencer  in  assuring  us  that  we  need  not  look  beyond  nature  for 
the  highest  sanctions  for  conduct,  and  then  covertly  introducing 
the  idea  of  the  divine  (which,  if  it  means  anything  at  all,  must 
mean  pretty  much  what  Mr.  Ividd  means  by  the  supernatural)  by 
including  it  in  the  environment  in  which  the  evolutionary  process 
takes  place;  or  Mr.  Charles  H.  Pearson  lamenting  "the  decay  of 
character"  and  "the  decline  of  family  life,"  and  seeking  a  substi- 
tute for  an  obligatory  morality  in  the  "religion  of  the  state" — 
what  if  we  cannot  accept  the  doctrine  of  these  new  teachers  of 
righteousness?  The  voice  may  be  the  voice  of  Jacob,  but  the 
hands  seem  to  us  like  the  hands  of  Esau. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  conceivable  that  progress  may  continue, 
though  the  conditions  of  progress  may  change,  just  as  a  calculat- 
ing machine,  as  Babbage  showed,  might  be  constructed  to  work 
for  any  fixed  length  of  time  according  to  a  certain  law,  and  then 
might,  from  a  ceVtain  point,  proceed  according  to  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent law.  To  us  it  does  not  seem  so  strange  that  social  progress 
should  take  place  up  to  a  certain  point  under  ape  and  tiger  in- 
stincts, and  that  beyond  that  point  progress  may  continue  only  by 
letting  the  ape  and  the  tiger  in  us  die  (though  Professor  Huxley 
has  been  criticised  for  splitting  up  "the  world-order  into  two 
separate  halves,"  and  going  back  on  his  fundamental  principle 
of  continuity).  This  only  means  that  with  the  advent  of  man 
came  in  certain  new  elements,  namely,  reason  and  conscience,  in 
virtue  of  which  what  was  before  a  natural  or  non-moral  world 
was  converted  into  an  ethical  world.  Instead  of  the  thorn  has 
sprung  up  the  fir  tree,  and  instead  of  the  brier  has  sprung  up  the 
myrtle  tree.  But  the  strange  thing  is,  that  these  latest  coijxist- 
ing  products  should,  according  to  the  present  theory,  be  inherently 


468  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

antagonistic.  In  other  words,  suppose  we  admit  that  progress  is 
necessary,  and  say  that  the  cosmic  process,  whether  there  be  mind 
back  of  it  or  not,  is  working  out  its  own  ends  in  developing  con- 
science; with  the  advent  of  conscience  came  also  reason,  which 
must  also  have  a  part  to  plaj,  and  an  important  part,  in  this  great 
drama.  But  here  nature  seems  to  be  divided  against  herself  in 
making  conscience  dictate  one  thing  and  reason  another.  Keason 
says,  "Strive  only  for  self";  conscience  says,  "Consider  your 
neighbor."  What  shall  we  do  ?  The  parable  reminds  us  that  this 
division-status  is  an  unstable  one.  Nature  has  conceived  and 
brought  forth  twins,  which,  instead  of  furthering  life,  seem  bent 
upon  destroying  each  other.  Thus  Professor  Huxley  and  thus 
Mr.  Kidd,  only  with  this  difference :  that  the  former  chooses  the 
nobler  part,  and  says  that  man  must  ally  himself  with  conscience 
and  combat  the  cosmic  process,  while  the  latter  says  that  man 
will  not  act  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  reason.^ 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  there  may  be  two  ways  out  of  this 
dilemma.  In  the  first  place,  we  may  refuse  to  admit  the  validity 
of   the  distinction  between    the   "ethical"    and   the    "natural" 

'  It  is  a  little  curious  that  I  should  have  expressed  ray  opinion  here  in  words  so 
similar  to  those  subsequently  used  by  Mr.  Kidd  in  a  foot-note  to  the  article  above 
cited  in  deprecation  of  the  very  criticism  here  offered.  Says  Mr.  Kidd:  "I  do  not 
know  whether  any  reader  of  Social  Evolution  who  has  done  me  the  honor  to  study  the 
book  closely  will  feel  that  what  has  been  said  here  suggests  a  criticism  that  I  have 
taken  pains  to  answer  beforehand  in  the  book  itself,  namely,  that  I  might  be  taken 
to  have  represented  the  nature  of  man  as  a  house  divided  against  itself.  I  have  en- 
deavored to  make  it  clear  throughout  that  the  religious  feeling,  that  is,  the  willing- 
ness to  submit  to  sanctions  beyond  reason,  is  not  only  just  as  much  part  of  man's 
nature  as  any  other,  but  that  it  is  the  most  characteristic  part  of  it — a  part  which 
is  being  continually  developed  by  the  process  of  evolution  in  progress.  The  sanc- 
tion for  submitting  to  the  cosmic  process  is  in  man ;  it  is  not  in  his  reason.  It  is 
not  beyond  him;  it  is  simply  beyond  his  reason."  To  which  we  may  reply,  sub- 
stantially in  the  words  of  Mr.  Balfour,  that  this  resolves  the  religious  feeling  into  an 
instinct,  which  is  "nothing  better  than  a  device  of  nature  to  trick  us  into  the  per- 
formance of  altruistic  actions. "  It  is  one  of  nature's  devices  to  insure  the  survival 
of  the  species  and  to  further  social  progress,  and  may  be  fittingly  compared  "to 
the  protective  blotches  on  the  beetle's  back."  {Foundations  of  Belief ,  pp.  16,  18.) 
The  question,  then,  still  remains  as  to  the  relation  between  reason  and  this  "re- 
ligious instinct;"  as  to  whether  reason  can  invalidate  or  "circumvent"  this  in- 
stinct, as  it  has  already  circumvented  some  of  the  most  important  of  them.  (Cf. 
IVie  Nineteenth  Century,  February,  1895,  p.  229.) 


kidd's  social  evolution.  4:69 

world,  as  well  as  the  antinomy  between  reason  and  conscience. 
In  other  words,  we  may  insist  that  the  "  strugcijle  for  the  life  of 
others"  is  as  natural  and  as  rational  as  the  "straggle  for  life," 
and  may  seek  to  show  not  only  that  the  interest  of  the  individual 
and  the  welfare  of  the  organism  are  always  identical,  but  also  that 
the  moral  life  begins  with  the  amceha  or  the  oyster  or  the  ape,  as 
the  case  may  be.  Authorities  differ.  Haeckel  is  less  compli- 
mentary to  the  brutes  than  Drummond,  for  the  German  profes- 
sor holds  that  "it  is  only  in  the  most  highly  developed  vertebrates 
— birds  and  mammals — that  we  discern  the  lirst  beginnings  of 
reason,  the  first  traces  of  religious  and  ethical  conduct."  Or,  in 
the  second  place,  we  may  follow  Professor  Huxley  in  refusing  to 
see  any  morality  in  the  workings  of  non-human  nature.  Ethic 
begins  with  man  and  not  with  lamprey-eels,  or  monkeys.  This 
is  the  view  taken  by  our  author,  and  we  have  no  hesitation  in 
following  him  here.  There  remains,  then,  the  antagonism  between 
reason  the  egoist,  and  conscience  the  altruist.  And  this,  again, 
can  be  settled  in  one  of  two  ways :  either  by  showing  that  there 
is  no  casus  helli  and  that  the  would-be  enemies  should  be  friendly 
allies,  or  by  the  lawful,  rational  submission  of  one  of  the 
parties. 

As  to  the  former  alternative,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  some 
truth  in  Mr.  Spencer's  view.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  indi- 
viduaFs  interest  and  the  interest  of  the  organism  are  commonly 
at  variance.  We  hold  that  honesty  is  not  only  right,  but  is,  ordi- 
narily, the  best  policy  also  ;  that  a  man  shall  reap  as  he  sows ;  that 
God's  ordinary  way  of  punishing  is  by  the  working  of  natural 
law  and  not  by  miracle,  so  that  if  a  man  abuse  the  laws  of  health 
he  will  suffer;  if  improvident  he  may  starve,  and  will  certainly 
have  to  beg.  There  is  much  rational  sanction  for  conduct  in  the 
nature  of  things.  Further  than  this,  there  is  the  fear  of  social 
ostracism,  and  the  danger  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  police. 
These  furnish  wholesome  restraints  upon  conduct.  Again,  Mr. 
Kidd  probably  over-emphasizes  the  pure  selfishness  of  man. 
Doubtless  there  is  at  least  a  modicum  of  altruistic  feeling  which 
is  natural  to  man.  He  is  not  wholly  vile.  This  is  one  thing  we 
had  in  mind  in  saying  that  Mr.  Kidd's  method  could  to  some  ex- 


470  THE  PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

tent  be  separated  from  his  results.  For  it  is  one  thing  to  say  that 
(3onscience  is  only  developed  instinct  and  that  the  idea  of  obliga- 
tion has  its  origin  in  experience,  and  quite  a  different  thing  to 
say  that  the  idea  of  oughtness  being  ultimate,  experience  has 
educated  the  conscience  and  filled  up  the  categories  of  obligation. 
The  former  view  would  no  doubt  invalidate  the  moral  argument 
and  undermine  the  authority  of  conscience.  For  suppose  we 
grant  that  conscience  is  a  growth,  a  development  from  experience, 
and  that  we  see  its  rudimentary  forms  in  the  instincts  of  animals ; 
man  then  follows  his  instincts,  i.  e.,  his  conscience,  just  as  animals 
do.  But  the  difference  is,  that  man  has  also  his  reason  to  reckon 
with,  and  if  he  finds  that  his  instincts  are  irrational,  or,  in  other 
words,  if  he  explains  away  his  conscience,  he  will  no  longer  follow 
what  it  dictates.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  conceivable  that  we 
may  have  an  obligatory  morality  based  upon  a  theistic  conception, 
of  the  universe,  without  at  the  same  time  excluding  the  idea  of 
development  and  the  function  of  experience  from  the  moral  life. 
Given  conscience,  it  may  be  that  God  speaks  through  it  with  in- 
creasing clearness,  just  as,  for  example,  he  spoke  to  the  Jewish 
people  with  ever-increasing  fulness  of  revelation. 

Mr.  Spencer  and  the  evolutionary  ethic  may  be  right  in  con- 
tending that  experience  has  played  an  important  part  in  develop- 
ing the  moral  sentiments.  But,  as  M.  Molinari,  in  his  little 
book  on  jReligioji,  points  out,  the  conscience  must  be  armed 
as  well  as  enlightened,  and  while  it  may  be  the  function  of 
Bcience  and  political  economy  to  enlighten  the  conscience,  it  is 
only  religion  that  can  arm  it  with  authority.  Experience 
can  teach  expediency  but  not  obligation.  It  may  back  up 
its  teachings  by  the  sanctions  of  worldly  prudence  expressed 
in  very  high  terms.  It  may  teach  that  the  individual's  in- 
terest is  in  the  majority  of  cases  identical  with  the  interest  of 
the  social  organism.  But  what  we  want  is  an  ethic  that  will  ex- 
plain the  ultimate  ethical  problem,  the  idea  of  obligation,  without 
destroying  the  feeling  of  obligation,  and  will  (in  order  to  secure 
progress,  so  far  as  the  present  discussion  is  concerned)  compel  the 
individual  to  subordinate  his  own  interests  to  the  interests  of  the 
social  organism  in  those  cases  where  they  seem  to  be  at  variance. 


kidd's  social  evolution.  4:71 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  of  the  alternatives  mentioned  above, 
namely,  the  conflict  between  reason  and  conscience.  How  can 
we  settle  this  difficulty  ? 

Our  position  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  theologian  who  makes 
his  final  appeal  to  the  teaching  of  the  church  or  to  the  words  of 
Scripture.    Not  that  in  so  doing  lie  dishonors  reason:  in  a  certain 
sense  reason  must  be  the  '^  seat  of  autliority  in  religion,"  tlie  final 
court  of  appeal,  for  it  is  only  by  the  use  of  the  reason  that  we 
decide  that  the  teaching  of  the  church  or  of  the  Scriptures  is  to 
be  accepted  as  authoritative  and  ultimate.     But  having  once  con- 
stituted the  church  or  the  Bible  as  the  ultimate  authority  in  mat- 
ters of  religious  faith,  having  once  by  the  use  of  reason  found  an 
infallible  norm,  it  is  illogical  to  appeal  back  again  to  the  reason 
to  correct  the  norm.     There  cannot  be  two  norms.     The  differ- 
ence  between  rationalists   and    their   opponents  is   not  that  the 
former  make  their  appeal  to  reason  while  the  latter  walk  by  faith 
(the  one  appeals  to  reason  as  much  as  the  other),  but  rather  that 
the  ratiocinative  faculty  demands  of  the  latter  that  they  submit  to 
the  decision  of  the  higher  court,  while  the  former  do  not  see  suf- 
ficient ground  for  this  submission.     Either  position  is  rational 
enough.     The  irrational  position  is  that  which  first  sets  up  the 
Bible  or  the  church  as  the  constituted  norm   of  religious  truth 
and  then,  having  accepted  such  truth  in  toto,  rejects  it  in  jKcrtibus,^ 
or  which  having  declared  "  Lo,  here  is  a  greater,  let  us  hear  him," 
turns  again  from  Master  to  disciple.     Just  as  the  consistent  theo- 
logian, having   "proved  all  things,"    and  having  decided    upon 
rational  grounds  that  tlie  teaching  of  the  Scriptures   or  of  the 
church  is  infallible  in  all  matters  of  faith  and  practice,  does  not 
then  seek  to  wrest  the  things  therein  which  are  hard  to  be  under- 
stood ;  so  here,  having  convinced  ourselves  by  a  broad  survey,  by 
a  study  of  all  tlie  elements  concerned,  that  the  higher  reason  tells 
us  to  follow  the  dictates  of  conscience,  we  will  no  longer  be  trou- 
bled that  the  lower  reason  speaking  only  in  the  name  of  present 
worldly  interest  bids  us  pursue  a  policy  of  selfish  individualism. 
This  is,  of  course,  only  another  way  of  saying  that  the  individual's 
apparent  present  interests  are  disregarded  only  in  order  to  further 
his  real  welfare.     The  individual  submits  to  supernatural  sanctions 


472  THE  PRESBYTERIAN   QUARTERLY. 

of  conduct,  not  perhaps  because  such  conduct  as  is  enforced  is 
pleasing,  but  because  it  is  rational;  because,  that  is,  everj^thing 
considered,  such  conduct  is  best  for  him,  will  contribute  most  to 
his  welfare. 

We  are  not  now  seeking  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  adequate 
basis  for  morality  apart  from  the  sanctions  of  religion.  We  do 
not  believe  that  there  can  be — and  the  agnostics'  recent  answer 
to  the  question,  "Why  lead  a  moral  life?"  has  not  tended  to 
weaken  our  opinion — but  this  is  not  here  the  question.  What 
we  here  maintain  is,  that  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of 
man's  true  welfare,  everything  must  be  taken  into  account;  and, 
if  our  world-view  includes  the  ideas  of  God,  and  immortality,  and 
the  authority  of  conscience,  then  the  antinomy  between  conscience 
and  the  lower  or  hedonistic  reason  vanishes.  The  apparent  anti- 
nomy which  exists  between  conscience  and  the  lower  reason,  which 
is  identical  with  self-interest,  is  swallowed  up  in  the  higher  unity 
of  the  practical  reason.  Scale  this  height,  and  the  whole  outlook 
is  wonderfully  changed.  Stand  upon  this  vantage-ground,  and 
Mr.  Kidd's  paradoxes  disappear. 

Take  socialism,  for  example:  Mr.  Kidd  holds  that  "the  only 
social  doctrines  current  in  the  advanced  societies  of  to  day  which 
have  the  assent  of  reason  for  the  masses  are  the  doctrines  of  so- 
cialism. These  doctrines  may  be  ...  .  utterly  destructive 
to  the  prospects  of  future  progress  and  to  the  future  interests 
of  society;  but  ....  this  is  no  concern  of  the  individual  whose 
interest  it  is,  not  to  speculate  about  a  problematical  future  for 
unborn  generations,  but  to  make  the  best  of  the  present  for  him- 
self, according  to  his  lights."  In  other  words,  the  conditions 
which  favor  the  progress  of  the  race  are  distinctly  antagonistic  to 
the  welfare  of  the  masses  of  that  race,  and  these  conditions,  there- 
fore, have  no  sanction  in  reason.  It  seems  a  paradox  that  the 
conditions  under  which  social  progress  is  possible  are  without  the 
sanction  of  reason,  while  social  conditions  which  reason  does  jus- 
tify are  not  only  impractical)le,  but  would  effectually  stop  pro- 
gress. Is  progress,  then,  an  evil?  Or  is  rationality  an  evil?  Or 
is  there  something  the  matter  with  the  thesis  that  the  only  condi- 
tions under  which  progress  is  possible  are  irrational?     At  any 


kidd's  social  evolution.  473 

rate,  the  fact  remains,  that  man  has  continued  to  progress,  and 
with  the  full  use  of  his  reason.  Take  the  view  above  indicated, 
and  man's  long  and  weary  uphill  march  is  justified;  otherwise 
his  toil  was  unreasonable  and  foolisli.  May  it  not  be  that  it  is 
the  existence  of  conditions  which  would  stop  progress  that  is  un- 
reasonable as  well  as  impracticable  ? 

For  if  it  be  true,  as  Mr.  Kidd  acutely  points  out,  that  the  ma- 
terialistic socialism  of  the  school  of  Karl  Marx  is  really  the  purest 
kind  of  individualism,  why  not  consistently  carry  out  the  princi- 
ple? These  men  are  socialists,  not  from  love  of  their  fellow-men 
and  the  disinterested  motive  of  promoting  their  welfare,  but  from 
the  desire  for  "happiness  in  the  Benthamite  sense  of  plenty  of 
pigs'  wash."  If,  then,  we  proceed  on  the  principle  of  individual- 
ism, selfishness,  competition,  struggle  for  life  (that  is,  under  con- 
ditions of  progress) ;  if  we  adopt 

"the  simple  plan, 

That  they  should  take  who  have  the  power. 
And  they  should  keep  who  can," 

why  not,  then,  let  the  masses  and  "the  four  hundred,"  labor  and 
capital,  the  have-nots  and  the  haves,  fight  it  out  as  best  they  can, 
and  so  insure  progress?  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  strong 
yield  to  the  weak  through  the  operation  of  altruistic  sentiment, 
then  why  not  extend  the  application  of  this  principle  to  the  fur- 
thest limit,  so  as  to  take  into  consideration  the  future  conditions 
and  progress  of  the  race  ?  If  it  is  the  interest  of  the  individual 
simply  "to  make  the  best  of  the  present,  according  to  his  light," 
why,  then,  should  I  consider  the  masses?  But,  if  I  do  consider 
the  masses,  why  not  consider  the  condition  of  the  whole  social 
organism,  say  two  hundred  years  hence  ? 

Social  Evolution  will  be  of  value,  not  so  much  for  the  worth  of 
its  constructive  results  as  for  its  illustration  of  one  or  two  import- 
ant principles.  In  the  first  place,  it  shows  that  social  science 
must  be  approached  from  the  side  of  ethics,  and  is  to  be  treated 
in  connection  with  moral  philosophy  rather  than  as  a  branch  of 
political  economy.  I  suppose  it  would  be  generally  admitted  that, 
as  Professor  Flint  well  says,  "any  proposed  solution  of  a  social 
problem  would  be  suflaciently  refuted  as  soon  as  it  is  shown  logic- 


474  THE   PRESBYTERIAN  QUARTERLY. 

ally  to  issue  in  immorality."  The  same  writer  continues,  in  tlie 
words  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll:  "In  mathematical  reasoning,  the 
*  reduction  to  absurdity'  is  one  of  the  familiar  methods  of  dis- 
proof. In  political  reasoning,  the  'reduction  to  iniquity'  ought 
to  be  of  equal  value."  (Flint,  Socialising  p.  344.)  If  "the  moral 
law  is  the  law  of  progress,"  as  all  men,  from  Mr.  Lecky  to  Mr. 
Lilly,  seem  to  admit,  it  would  seem  to  be  necessary,  first  of  all,  to 
turn  our  attention  to  the  study  of  conduct.  What  are  right,  and 
what  are  wrong,  acts?  Why  are  certain  acts  right,  and  certain 
others  wrong?  What  is  the  ethical  ideal?  Has  it  changed;  and, 
if  so,  how  and  why?  What  ought  I  to  do,  and  what  to  leave  un- 
done? And  lohy  ought  I  to  do  either?  Granted  that  a  certain 
line  of  conduct  will  bring  about  certain  results,  how  insure  such 
conduct?  The  answer  to  these  questions  involves  much.  It  in- 
volves a  theory  of  the  universe.  One  cannot  get  rid  of  meta- 
physic  by  turning  one's  back  upon  it.  The  fundamental  social 
problem  is  an  ethical  problem,  and  the  fundamental  ethical  prob- 
lem is  metaphysical. 

Again,  Mr.  Kidd's  book  is  an  illustration  of  the  vagueness  and 
uncertainty  attaching  to  the  study  of  social  phenomena.  Men, 
young  men,  college  men  especially,  are  continually  turning  away 
from  the  study  of  metaphysics  and  theology  to  social  science  and 
political  economy,  because,  they  say,  they  want  something  practi- 
cal, substantial,  solid ;  they  want  less  speculation  and  larger  results. 
They  complain  of  the  unfruitfulness  of  metaphysics  and  the  un- 
certainty of  theology,  not  seeing  that  if  there  is  ever  to  be  cer- 
tainty and  agreement  about  anything  it  must  begin  with  tliose 
primary  convictions  which  underlie  all  social  systems,  and  that 
just  in  proportion  as  there  is  disagreement  as  to  fundamental 
questions  will  there  be  divergence  and  confusion  in  the  systems 
built  upon  them.  And  not  only  so;  not  only  do  men  apply  dif- 
ferent principles,  but  they  read  the  facts  very  differently.  So 
that  in  social  science  we  have  not  only  the  variant  systems  arising 
from  the  various  standpoints  of  their  authors,  but  we  have  in 
addition  to  this  the  manifold  differences  aiising  from  disagree- 
ment as  to  the  facts  themselves.  I  have  spoken  of  the  divergence 
between  Mr.  Kidd  and  Professor  Drummond.     But  what  are  we 


kidd's  social  evolution.  475 

to  think  when  Mr.  Kidd  attributes  progress  to  the  influence  of 
religion,  and  Mr.  Charles  H.  Pearson  regards  it  as  one  evidence  of 
progress  that  religion  is  dying  out ;  when  Mr.  Kidd  holds  that 
progress  is  inevitable  and  has  been  due  to  altruism  which  has 
brought  about  increased  rivalry  and  competition,  and  Mr.  Pearson 
asserts  that  state  socialism  is  unavoidable  and  with  it  the  cessation 
of  competition  ?  The  recent  discussions  of  social  questions  by 
Mackenzie,  Drummond,  Flint,  Pearson,  and  Kidd  furnish  suffi- 
cient illustration  of  the  divergent  views  that  prevail  in  regard  to 
human  society.  A  recent  experience  in  reading  these  books  has 
made  me  long  to  flee  from  this  region  of  "noise  and  smoke  "  back 
to  the  peace  and  certainty  of  the  "  eternal  verities  "  and  has  con- 
vinced me  more  than  ever  that  one  needs  to  have  a  comprehensive 
grasp  of  the  problems  of  philosophy  and  Christian  theology  before 
attempting  to  grapple  with  the  difficulties  of  social  science.  One 
should  have  his  lamp  lit  and  his  loins  girt  and  his  bearings  fixed 
before  setting  out  for  this  misty,  confusing  region. 

Finally,  it  is  only  in  the  light  of  a  Christian  theology  that 
social  problems  can  be  solved.  Grant  the  rationality  of  religion 
and  the  truth  of  Christianity,  and  Mr.  Kidd's  paradoxes  disappear 
and  his  book  furnishes  an  ingenious  witness  to  the  presence  of 
"  God  in  history."  Instead  of  saying  that  progress  depends  upon 
ethical  ideas  which  derive  their  sanction  from  a  theistic  construc- 
tion of  the  universe,  we  may  say  that  God  works  in  history  by 
putting  in  the  hearts  of  men  certain  intuitive  ethical  ideas  which, 
acted  upon,  lead  to  progress.  Thus  far  apart  from  Kevelation. 
But  we  may  go  a  step  farther  and  use  the  same  line  of  argument 
in  reference  to  the  nature  and  mission  of  the  church,  and  say 
that  the  church  is  the  line  along  which  God  works  in  history 
toward  the  redemption  of  the  world,  since  the  church  is  the 
medium  which  God  has  chosen  for  the  spread  of  those  ethical 
ideas  on  which  moral  growth  and  social  evolution  depend.  Still 
further,  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  harmonizes  for  us  what 
our  author  considers  an  inherent  antagonism,  since  the  view  of 
life  which  the  Christian  ethic  presents,  while  insuring  the  con- 
tinually developing  life  of  the  social  organism,  at  the  same  time 
provides  a  way  of  salvation  for   the  individual.     The  Christian 


476  THE  PRESBYTERIAN    QUARTERLY. 

scheme  not  onh^  rationalizes  altruism;  it  glorifies  the  individual. 
The  individual  in  order  to  realize  his  own  best  interests  (pure 
individualism)  is,  according  to  the  Christian  scheme,  bound  also 
at  the  same  time  to  manifest  that  "brotherly  love"  (altruism), 
which  is  the  life  of  the  community  and  the  condition  of  progress. 
And  conversely,  in  the  manifestation  of  that  "love  of  the 
bretliren"  which  has  its  root  in  "  the  love  of  God,"  the  indi- 
vidual attains  to  that  perfect  happiness  which  passe th  knowledge. 
It  is  along  such  lines  as  these,  and  along  such  lines  alone,  that 
the  problems  of  social  evolution  can  be  solved. 

George  S.  Patton. 
Princeton  College. 


